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Shirley: The Effect of Unrelated Business Taxable Income on the Tax Exempt

THE EFFECT OF UNRELATED BUSINESS TAXABLE INCOME
ON THE TAX EXEMPT STATUS OF A QUALIFIED TRUST
INTRODUCTION

Strategies for deferring compensation are often a means of providing future
security and, historically, certain tax benefits to employees. Arrangements involving pension, profit-sharing, or stock bonus plans are particularly advantageous if they qualify under section 401 of the Internal Revenue Code, as
Congress has conferred certain tax benefits on both employers contributing to
qualified plans and employees benefiting from them.1 The purpose of this
article, however, is not to delve into the intricacies of subchapter D. Instead, it
will be assumed that the subchapter's labyrinth of rules has been successfully
negotiated to yield the finished product of a qualified plan.
Once a plan becomes qualified, it is subject to the provisions in subchapter
F of the Code. A trust forming part of a qualified plan is the critical element,
because the trust is provided exemption from income tax. While subchapter F
shields the trust from taxes imposed by chapter 1 of the Code, it levies a more
restricted tax of its own. That tax is imposed on the trust's unrelated business
taxable income (UBTI), which consists of gross income from an unrelated
2
trade or business regularly carried on, computed with certain modifications.
Subchapter F unequivocally tosses this retreating tax exemption into the
calculus of an investment policy of a qualified plan. Qualified trusts, though,
do not fit easily within the factual context of subchapter F, particularly those
sections regarding unrelated business taxable income. For the most part, the
cases and treasury regulations regarding exempt organizations address fact
patterns whose only common denominator with a qualified trust is tax exemption. Nevertheless, these principles of law must apply to qualified trusts as
neither statutory provision nor legislative history sanctions differential treatment. Thus, the analysis of this article will stray to seemingly irrelevant facts,
only to return with the germ of a rule which can be reconstituted factually in
the context of a qualified trust.
Before dissecting and examining the individual elements of UBTI,3 this
article will explore the relevant statutory mechanism. This article will next
discuss the substantive meaning of "unrelated trade or business" as it relates
to a qualified trust. An analysis of the "regularly carried on" requirement and
the necessary statutory modifications will follow. The scanty jurisprudence
relating to a qualified trust will be examined in the context of this last inquiry.

1. See I.R.C. § 401 (1982).
2. See id. § 512(a)(1).
3. The $500 billion of assets currently held in public and private pension systems alone
is a testimony to the timeliness of this topic, and the potential uses for such funds are a
concession to its importance. Figgie, Jr., Defusing the Pension Liability Bomb, FIN. MGMar.

406 (1983).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1983

1

Florida Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 5 [1983], Art. 7
UNIVERSITY

OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXV

STATUTORY ANALYSIS

A trust forming part of a pension, profit-sharing, or stock bonus plan 4 shall
constitute a qualified trust if it satisfies the requirements of section 401(a) of
the Internal Revenue Code.5 Qualification entitles both the beneficiaries of the
trust and its contributors to favorable tax treatment. 6 Earnings of a qualified
trust, however, are not accorded favorable tax treatment under subchapter D.
Absent the intercession of some other provision of the Code, trust earnings
attributable to investments held and activities conducted are subject to tax as
are those of any other entity.
Subchapter F contains the definition and rules governing organizations
exempt from tax and extends that exemption to the qualified trust. 7 This general exemption, however, is subject to the exception in part III of subchapter
F, which imposes a tax on. the business income of certain exempt organizations. 8 Section 511 (a)(1) imposes this tax 9 on unrelated business taxable income
(UBTI). UBTI is defined as gross income derived from any unrelated trade or
business regularly carried on. 10
Section 513(a) defines an "unrelated trade or business" as any trade or
business which is not substantially related to the exercise by the organization
of the purpose which constitutes the foundation for its exemption under sec4. Subchapter D consists of I.R.C. §§ 401-425 (1982). Part I (§§ 401-418E) sets forth the
general rules regarding certain income tax consequences of pension, profit-sharing, and stock
bonus plans.
5. See I.R.C. § 401 (1982).
6. Id.
7. Subchapter F incorporates I.R.C. §§ 502-528 (1982). Section 501(a) confers tax income
exemptions on three general classes of acquisitions: organizations described in subsections
501(c), (d) and 401(a). See id. § 501(a). Only the last of these will be referred to hereinafter
as a qualified trust.
A perusal of § 501(c) reveals a variety of organizations and functions which receive tax
exemptions. Section 501(d), on the other hand, is limited to religious and apostolic organizations. Although the arguments and issues presented in this paper will be relevant in varying
degrees to such organizations, the thrust of this article will address issues in the context of a
qualified trust.
8. See id. §§ 511-515 (1982). Section 502 denies tax exemption to certain feeder organizations, so named because their profits are funneled and thus "fed" to another exempt organization. Id. § 502(a). This statutory rule supplanted earlier judicial doctrine which expanded
tax exemption to include entities whose income was destined to a tax exempt organization.
A qualified trust does not so appoint its profits to another exempt entity, but rather holds
them in trust for the benefit of employees. See id. § 401(a). Consequently, the rules governing feeder organizations do not directly affect qualified trusts, but may nevertheless
constitute a collateral source of interpretative guidance.
Section 503 denies tax exemption to otherwise tax exempt organizations which engage in
certain prohibited transactions, but are still subject to severe excise taxes for such activities.
Id. §§ 4971-4975. Section 503 provides two exceptions to this rule. Governmental plans and
church plans, as defined in § 4975(g)(2) and (3), respectively, lose the exemption granted
under § 501(a) if they engage in the enumerated prohibited transactions. See id. § 503(a)(1)(B).
All other qualified trusts, though, merely suffer an excise tax.
9. This tax is to be computed as provided in § 11, except in the case of those trusts described in § 511(a)(2), which are taxed at rates set forth in § (1)(e). See id. § 511(a).
10. Id. § 512(a)(1).
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don 501."1 For trusts, however, section 513(b) provides that an unrelated trade
2
or business means "any trade or business regularly carried on by such trust."'1
Therefore, a qualified trust will be subject to taxation under section 511 when
it engages in a trade or business and that trade or business is regularly carried
on. 3
The mechanics of sections 511 and 513 are statutorily concise, but the root
of the formula for UBTI lies in the substantive meaning of each individual
element. Only after the individual elements are isolated and defined can they
bring meaning to the shorthand of the Internal Revenue Code. Since the
foundation for UBTI is, with respect to a qualified trust, any trade or business,
the meaning of "trade or business" is the appropriate starting point.
TRADE OR BusINEss
Section 513(c)
4

For purposes of section 513,1 trade or business "includes any activity which
is carried on for the production of income from the sale of goods or the performance of services."' 5 This statement does not purport to be an exclusive
definition of trade or business, as it merely calls for the inclusion of certain
activities.26 Moreover, the section provides that an activity does not necessarily
lose its trade or business classification because it is carried on with an aggregate
of other activities which may, or may not, be related to the organization's
exempt purpose."7 Finally, section 513(c) establishes profit motive, as opposed
to actual profit, as the crucial test for determining "trade or business."' s
The Treasury Department's interpretation of section 513(c) mirrors the
statute but reflects a broader scope for "trade or business" by finding it to have
the same meaning as in section 162.2 9 Prior to the enactment of section 513(c),20
the Treasury feared it lacked power to penetrate an aggregate of activities and
segregate those which singularly constituted an unrelated trade or business. 2'
For example, an exempt organization might have a publication, which was in
11.

Id. § 513(a).

12. Id. § 513(b) (emphasis added).
13. The gross income from such trade or business is adjusted as provided in § 512 and
taxed at the rates set forth in § 511.
14. It is important to remember that § 513 is the foundation upon which §§ 511 and
512 build.

15. I.R.C. § 513(c) (1982).
16. See id. § 7701(b), which states: "The terms 'includes' and 'including' when used in a
definition contained in this title shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise within
the meaning of the term defined."
17. Id. § 513(c). See infra authorities cited in notes 20 and 21.

18. I.R.C. § 513(c) (1982). Noticeably absent in the context of § 513(c) is any rule pertaining to the advertising activities so prominently displayed in its heading.
19. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b), T.D. 7392, 1971-1 C.B. 162, 168.
20. Regulation § 1.513-1(b) preceded the enactment-of § 513(c), which was added by the
Tax Reform Act of 1969. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 121(c), 83 Stat. 487,
542-43 (1969).
21. S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 75 (1969), reprintedin 1969-3 C.B. 423, 472, and
in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. 8- AD. Naws 2027, 2104.
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furtherance of its exempt purpose, that also generated advertising revenue. 22
The Treasury argued the advertising revenue was not in furtherance of an
exempt purpose and requested statutory authority to segregate this income.23
Congress responded with an effective codification of the current regulations.
Although section 513(c) was deliberately expanded to reach more than the
targeted evil, it was not intended to derogate the rule espoused in Treasury
Regulation section 1.513-1(b) that trade or business is to be interpreted as in
section 162.24 The inquiry, then, is twofold. First, the question arises as to
whether the Treasury interpretation of "trade or business" as that employed in
section 162 is valid. 25 If so, what substantive meaning does "trade or business"
contribute to the definition of UBTI? The latter question is answerable via
resort to the legislative history of UBTI. The former entails a more protracted
sojourn into the very roots of taxation.
Unrelated Business Taxble Income:
An HistoricalNutshell
The prevalent attitude toward tax exemption historically has been a broad
one, rooted in the common law notions of charity.26 Tax exemption cloaked
the earnings of exempt organizations as well as those of non-exempt organizations which paid their earnings to a tax exempt entity.2 7 This extension to
non-exempt organizations, deemed the destination of income doctrine, exemplifies the liberal attitude toward tax exemption.
In the 1940s, the Treasury was unsuccessful in its efforts to constrain the
growing business activity of exempt organizations.- Congress responded by
adding section 42229 (later to become sections 511 to 513)30 to the Internal
22.
23.

See Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(4)(iv) (examples) (1983).
See S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 75 (1969), reprinted in 1969-3 C.B. 423, 472,

and in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2027, 2104.

24. Nothing in the legislative history of § 513(c) evidences a contrary intent. Compare
I.R.C. § 513(c) (1982) with Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b), T.D. 7392, 1971-1 C.B. 162, 168.
25. See Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber, 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1948) (interpretive
regulations must be upheld unless unreasonable and plainly inconsistent with the revenue
statutes). Absent a specific grant of authority to promulgate regulations under a given statute,
the regulations fall within the general grant of authority under I.R.C. § 7805 and are, as in
the case of § 513, interpretive regulations. For a textual explanation of Treasury Regulations
in general, see SALTZMAN, I.R.S. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 9 3.02 (1981).
26. See B. BITTKER, FEDERAL INCOME, ESTATE, AND GrT TAXATION 9 100.1 (2d ed. 1958)
(for a linkage of charitable organizations and the British Statute of Charitable Uses of 1601);
see also Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971) (an historical discussion of income tax exemption).
27. See Roche's Beach, Inc. v. Commissioner, 96 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1938) (profits from a
business are not subject to income taxation if they are paid to a tax exempt entity).
28. Cf. University Hill Found. v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 548, 562 (1969) (general discussion of the evolution of administrative and congressional concern for feeder organizations
and UBTI), rev'd, 446 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1971).
29. Revenue Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 814, 64 Stat. 906 (1950). See H.R. REP. No. 2319,
81st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 124 (1950), reprinted in I J. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN's LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF FEDERAL INCOME AND EXCESS PROFITS TAX LAWS, 1939-1953, at 1482-83 (1954).

30.

See I.R.C. §§ 511-513 (1982).
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Revenue Code of 1939, which imposed a tax on the UBTI of a tax exempt
organization. Simultaneously, Congress provided in section 101 a denial of tax
exemption to organizations whose claimed exemption rested solely on payment of their profits to an exempt organization.3a Thus the destination of
income doctrine was abolished and non-exempt "feeder" organizations could
no longer receive tax exemption by directing their profits to a tax exempt
32

entity.

The legislative history of section 422 indicates Congress perceived the taxfree acquisition of businesses by tax exempt entities unfairly disadvantaged
non-exempt competitors. 33 The announced purpose of the tax on unrelated
business income was to remedy this unfair competition. s Effectuation of this
purpose required choosing a threshold level at which the tax would apply.
Accordingly, Congress decided the threat of unfair competition arose once
and to the extent the tax exempt entity engaged in an "unrelated trade or
business regularly carried on." Congress unequivocally stated that "trade or
business" has the same meaning as elsewhere in the Code. 3s The Treasury
acknowledges this bond between trade or business as defined in sections 162
and 513 in its regulation section 1.513-l(b).6
31. Revenue Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 814, 64 Stat. 906 (1950). See H.R. REP. No. 2319,
81st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 124 (1950), reprinted in I J. SEIDMAN, supra note 29, at 1482-83 (general discussion of the motivating policies behind I.R.C. § 101 (1939)). This admonition remains in § 502 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. See I.R.C. § 502 (1954).
32. See supra note 8. The legislative history of § 101 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1939 offers little assistance in defining "trade or business," but its goal, shared with the tax
on UBTI, and simultaneous enactment with § 422 supports consistent interpretation. Rejection of feeder organizations was a necessary counterpart to imposition of a tax on UBTI
since such a tax could otherwise be easily circumvented by separately incorporating the unrelated business component of an exempt organization. Although feeder organizations are
of little concern to qualified trusts, the common kinship with § 422 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1939 tends to tie the sections to consistent judicial interpretation.
33. H.R. REP.No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 103-109 (1950); S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong.,
2d Sess. 110-112 (1950), reprintedin 1950 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3164-68.
34. "The problem at which the tax on unrelated business income is directed here is
primarily that of unfair competition. The tax-free status of section 101 organizations enables them to use their profits tax-free to expand operations, while their competitors can
expand only with the profits remaining after taxes." H.R. REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.
36 (1950), reprinted in II J. SEIDMAN, supra note 29, at 2359-60.
35. Id. at 108-09, reprintedin II J. SEIDMAN, supra note 29, at 2360.
36. The pertinent part of Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b) states:
The primary objective of adoption of the unrelated business income tax was to eliminate a source of unfair competition by placing the unrelated business activities of
certain exempt organizations upon the same tax basis as the nonexempt business endeavors with which they compete. . . . [I]n general, any activity of a section 511
organization which is carried on for the production of income and which otherwise
possesses the characteristics required to constitute "trade or business" within the
meaning of section 162- and which, in addition, is not substantially related to the
performance of exempt functions -presents sufficient likelihood of unfair competition
to be within the policy of the tax. Accordingly, for purposes of section 513 the term
"trade or business" has the same meaning it has in section 162, and generally includes
any activity carried on for the production of income from the sale of goods or performance of services.
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Section 422 of the 1939 Code, however, did not pertain to qualified trusts.
37
Such trusts were instead allowed income tax exemption under section 165(a).
With the adoption of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, subchapter F, which
governs tax exempt organizations including qualified trusts, was added. The
provisions governing unrelated business taxable income were also made specifically applicable to section 401(a) trusts. 3 8 Consistent with these measures,
section 513(b) was amended to provide that with respect to a qualified trust,
an unrelated trade or business is "any trade or business regularly carried on."-9
Significantly, the statute, the legislative history, and the subsequently enacted
regulations fail to indicate any intent to alter the meaning of "trade or business." The unassailable conclusion is that the legislative history supports the
Treasury's adoption of section 162 as the interpretative referent of section 513
and demands equal application to qualified trusts and other exempt organizations.
The Conception of Trade or Business: Section 162

Section 162 allows a deduction for the ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in a trade or business,. 0 but neither section 162 nor the applicable regulations define "trade or business." 41 Thus, the judiciary has been left to deTreas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b), T.D. 7392, 1971-1 C.B. 162, 168.
37. I.R.C. § 165(a) (1939).
38. See generally H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A170 (1954), reprinted in 1954
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4017, 4039 (legislative history concerning the subjection of
qualified trusts to UBTI); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 311, reprinted in 1954 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4621, 4951.
39. I.R.C. § 513(b) (1982).
40. Id. § 162.
41. A very early predecessor statute referred only to "business" expenses, but was later
expanded to "trade or business" without evidence of any alteration in the meaning. It was
thereafter incorporated in the Internal Revenue Codes of 1939 and 1954. Section 38 of the
Revenue Act of 1909, ch. 6, 36 Stat. 11, 112 (1909), levied a special excise tax on carrying on
or doing business. The companion section, § 38(2d), provided "net income shall be ascertained
by deducting . . . all the ordinary and necessary expenses . . . paid . . . in the maintenance
" Section 38(2d), 36 Stat. 11, 112 (1909). Therefore, in the
and operation of its business ..
beginning, both the tax base and the test for deductibility were tied to "business."
The Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II, 38 Stat. 114, 166, (1913), expanded the tax base
to the net income of every citizen, but § II(b), 38 Stat. 114, 167 (1913), provided deduction
only for "the necessary expenses actually paid in carrying on any business, not including
personal, living, or family expenses." Section 5(a) of the Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 5(a),
39 Stat. 756, 759 (1916), followed with an expanded definition providing: "For the purpose
of the tax there shall be allowed as deductions -First. The necessary expenses actually paid
in carrying on any business or trade, not including personal, living or family-expenses."
There seems to be no indication in legislative history that "trade" was intended to affect the
meaning of "business." One might reasonably project it was added to insure deductions for
individuals which were now taxable under the sixteenth amendment.
Section 214 of the Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 214(a), 40 Stat. 1057, 1066 (1918), made
only syntactical changes in the deduction provision, allowing "[a]ll the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business ..
" This portion of § 214 remained unchanged, and in the Revenue Act of 1928, ch.
852, 45 Stat. 791, 799 (1928), it was incorporated verbatim in § 23(a). The clause remains
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velop the concept. In performing this function, courts generally agree whether
one is engaged in a trade or business is a question of fact.4 2 This fact-specific
inquiry generally results in defining the term by example only. 43 This approach, however, tends to ignore the reality that even questions of fact must
have some measure. Absent some standard, a pure question of fact leaves open
the possibility of unreviewable discretion.
Although courts have had difficulty in disclosing or articulating it precisely, prolific case law indicates there is a substantive meaning to "trade or
business." 4 4 Thus, a uniform rule must exist which transcends individual
factual variations even though that rule may incorporate a measure of elasticity designed to accommodate, to varying degrees, the facts. It is therefore
appropriate to explore the concept in search of a theme which might reveal
the elusive meaning of "trade or business."
Trade or Business: Activity
The absence of early legislative history defining "trade or business" may
indicate agreement with the generally accepted meaning of the term. Although
the issues before the Supreme Court in early tax cases did not expressly require
an interpretation of "business," the holdings and rationale of the Court rested
on clearly stated assumptions about the meaning of that term. In Pollock v.
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.,45 for example, the statute at issue imposed a tax
measured by two percent of individual and corporate net income. 46 The tax
was challenged as unconstitutional on the grounds that it was a direct tax and
therefore must be apportioned among the states in accordance with their population. 47 Agreeing with this contention, the Supreme Court stated that a tax on
real property is a direct tax. A tax imposed on the income or rents from real
property is effectively the same as a tax on the property. Therefore, a tax on
the income from real property is a direct tax and must be apportioned.- On
rehearing, the majority articulated a similar rule for personal property, concluding that a tax on the rents from personal property is a direct tax on the
property.49 Since the Court could not salvage that portion of the statute which
taxed income other than that received solely from the property, the entire
statute was declared unconstitutional.50
unchanged today, although it was redesignated as § 162 in the Internal Revenue Code of
1954.
42. See, e.g., Deputy v. duPont, 308 U.S. 488,499 (1940) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
43. See generally Groh, "Trade or Business": what it means, what it is and what it is not,
26 J. TAx'N 78 (1967) (author generally cites jurisprudence in various sections which incorporate the term "trade or business").
44. A search of all circuits and courts via LEXIS produced in excess of 37,000 cases
containing the term "trade or business." This is complicated by the 1,320 appearances of the
term "trade or business" in the Internal Revenue Code.
45. 157 U.S. 429 (1895).

46. Act of 1894, ch. 349, § 27, 28 Stat. 509, 553 (1894).
47. 157 U.S. at 432.

48. Id. at 583.
49. P ollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 637 (1895).
50. Id.
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Several years later, before the enactment of the sixteenth amendment,
Congress levied an income tax upon the "business" carried on by corporations.5' In Flint v. Stone Tracy Co.,52 taxpayers, engaged in the ownership,

leasing and management of taxicabs, argued that the "business" tax was unconstitutional under Pollock. The taxpayers asserted that the challenged tax
was a direct tax because it was levied upon real and personal property estates,
and was therefore unconstitutional for want of apportionment.53 To this
charge, the Court reasoned that the purpose of the constitutional rule of apportionment was to prevent the levy of taxes on persons, based on their general ownership of property, by any method other than apportionment.5 4 A tax
on income derived from real property was perceived the legal equivalent of a
tax on the property and must therefore be apportioned.55 The Court noted,
however, the challenged tax fell neither upon the corporation's franchise nor
its property but upon the carrying on of corporate business.56 The Court concluded that a substantial difference exists between a tax on the "actual doing
of business" and "mere ownership of property." Taxes levied on business are
excise taxes because they fall upon activities, not ownership, and these taxes
57

need not be apportioned.

The taxpayers also contended that the use of income as a measure of the
tax was arbitrary and exceeded the taxing authority of Congress. 3 The taxpayers reasoned that since the tax fell solely upon "business," only that income
derived from property used in such business should be the basis of the tax.5 9
Thus, if a corporation held property as investment, a tax on "income" from
that property would violate Pollock because it would be a direct tax on such
investments. The Court disagreed, finding a tax imposed upon doing business
constitutional notwithstanding the derivation of income from investment property.60 Accordingly, when a taxpayer engages in a business, traditionally passive
investments will no longer be considered held primarily for investment, but
rather will be subsumed in the business purpose. This approach obviates the

51. Revenue Act of 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112 (1909).
52. 220 U.S. 107 (1911).
53. See id. at 119, 121, 131-32.

54. Id. at 149-50.
55. Id.
56. "'Business'," said the Court, "is a very comprehensive term and embraces everything
about which a person can be employed." Id. at 171.
57. Id. at 151-52.
58. See id. at 117, 123.
59. See id. at 121.
60. Id. at 163-65. Additionally, the Court stated:
Nor can it be justly said that investments have no real relation to the business
transacted by a corporation. The possession of large assets is a busines advantage of
great value; it may give credit which will result in more economical business methods;
it may give a standing which shall facilitate purchases; it may enable the corporation
to enlarge the field of its activities and in many ways give it business standing and
prestige.
Id. at 166.
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task of tracing income and analyzing the purpose for which a particular asset
is held.
Ultimately, the sixteenth amendment mooted the distinction between
direct and indirect taxes with respect to a tax on income. The preoccupation
with the "source" of income, though, is firmly etched on the face of the amendment which states "[t]he Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on
income, from whatever source derived... ."61 Moreover, the concept of "source

of income" and its role in the interpretation of business survives in the Internal Revenue Code. Ironically, it is only by the Supreme Court's admitted
error in Pollock, equating a tax on income from property with a tax on the
property, that the indispensable link is made permitting one to trace the
Court's rudimentary assumptions regarding income arising from activity and
8
income received from the ownership of capital.

2

Trade or Business:
Income Derived From Activity
While "activity" was recognized as an essential ingredient in a "trade or
business," "holding one's self out to others as engaged in the selling of goods
or services" was regarded as an equally important factor. 63 This relationship
between the activity of a trade or business and the actual flow of income was
explored by the Supreme Court in Higgins v. Commissioner.-4 The taxpayer
61. U.S. CONsT. amend. XVI (emphasis added).
62. See Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939) (formal rejection of the
doctrine established in Pollock that a tax on income from property is the legal equivalent
of a tax on the property).
63. Such a sentiment was articulated by Justice Frankfurter in Deputy v. duPont: "To
avail of the deductions allowed by § 23(a), it is not enough to incur expenses in the active
concern over one's own financial interest. . .. '[Ojarrying on a trade business,' within the
contemplation of § 23(a), involves holding one's self out to others as engaged in the selling
of goods or services." 308 U.S. 488, 499 (1940) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter's reasoning has not gone uncriticized. See I B. BrrrKs, supra note 26, f1 20, at 7.
Professor Bittker argues this definition is erroneous since an employee is engaged in a trade
or business although he may never work for more than one employer, and thus never holds
himself out to the public. Similar criticism has been expressed by the Tax Court in defining trade or business with regards to self-employment tax, which specifically incorporates
§ 162. See Hornandy, 81 T.C. 51 (1983) (Tax Court rebuked the "holding out" notion, as
well as a test based on the quantity of actual activity). In Hornandy, the Tax Court held:
"The proper focus in arriving at this determination [whether or not one is conducting a
trade or business] is not solely the volume of clients or customers an activities generates.
Rather, the determination must be made on the basis of all of the facts and circumstances
of a particular case" (parenthetical added).
Unfortunately, a much more logical interpretation has been overlooked. The notion of
"holding out" to others merely distinguishes between taxable and nontaxable sources of
income or economic benefit, so that imputed income from the provision of goods or services
cannot establish a trade or business. This would not impair the court's concern with quantity
of activity although that issue could be better resolved by expanding "the selling of goods
and services" to include the anticipated selling of goods and services. This rationale is consistent with precedent establishing trade or business based upon profit motive instead of'
actual profit. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1(a) (1975). These broad legal standards are far superior
to the unchecked "facts and circumstances" test of the Tax Court,
64. 312 U.S. 212, reh'g denied, 312 U.S. 714 (1941).
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in Higgins spent considerable time and expense managing his securities. He
employed an attorney, office manager, and bookkeepers and rented office space
and equipment. 65 The taxpayer claimed deductions attributable to these expenses under the predecessor of section 162.66 The Commissioner disallowed
the deductions, arguing that expenses incurred in the management of one's
67
own securities are not incurred in a trade or business.
The Board of Tax Appeals held the expenses nondeductible on two
grounds. 68 First, the Board relied on Kane v. Commissioner9 where the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals held that taxpayer's employment of a bookkeeper
and investment manager did not raise her investment activities to the level of
a trade or business. 70 Although the level of management activities was much
greater in Higgins, the Board viewed the nature of the expenses, rather than
their frequency, as the critical issue.71 The Board next inquired whether the
taxpayer derived income from the provision of services. Like the Kane court,
the Board found that management activities with respect to one's own securities
are personal in nature.7 2 The Board concluded that the taxpayer's income was
derived through investment, or the mere ownership of property, and not
through services the taxpayer provided for himself in managing his securities
73
or the sale of goods.
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the taxpayer argued "activity" is the essence of a trade or business and even management of one's
securities could constitute a trade or business provided sufficient business
activity was present.7 4 The Supreme Court disagreed and adhered to the
reasoning of the Board of Tax Appeals that no amount of personal investment
management activity could constitute a trade or business. 7 5 The taxpayer also
65. 312 U.S. at 213-14.
66. Id. The predecessor of I.R.C. § 162, § 23(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939,
and § 162 do not differ in any respect material to this issue.
67. Id. at 214.
68. 39 B.T.A. 1005, 1015 (1939). Initially, the Board qualified its conclusion by pointing
out that taxpayer had not contended he was a dealer in securities. Id.
69. 100 F.2d 382 (2d Cir. 1938).
70. Id. at 383.
71. 39 B.T.A. at 1014-15. The reasoning of the Board of Tax Appeals corresponds to
notions espoused in Deputy v. duPont and by the Treasury that "trade or business" denotes
income from the sale of goods or services. Significantly, the Board disposed of an initial issue
concerning whether the taxpayer was a dealer in securities. Since this issue was resolved via
stipulation in the negative, taxpayer did not derive income from the sale of goods.
72. Id. The Board first assumed that personal attention to one's own affairs is a business.
Id. at 1014. Therefore, expenses incurred in paying another to perform those services cannot
establish a business. Id. See I.R.C. § 262 (1982). The Board's holding rests on the contention
that "business" does not extend to situations in which a taxpayer does only that which is
necessary from an investment point of view. Implicit in this reasoning is the assumption that
services rendered to oneself, or imputed income, does not establish a business. Otherwise,
payment for those services would be incurred in a business. Thus, the Board resolved the
issue in part on the assumed status of imputed income, and a recognition that "income"
anticipates some interaction with another taxable entity.
73. 89 B.T.A. 1005, 1015 (1939).
74. 812 U.S. 212, 215 (1941).
75. Id. at 218.
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asserted that management of securities was a "business" as defined in Stone
Tracy Co. 7 1 The Court distinguished Stone Tracy Co., finding the immediate

issue in that case to be "whether corporations engaged principally in the
'holding and management of real estate' were subject to the act."' 7 The Court

thus affirmed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals and disallowed the
deductions.
The Court's distinction of Stone Tracy Co. is unduly narrow in its factual
orientation. Significantly, however, the Court did not retreat from the position
that business connotes activities. Instead, it refined "business" to include

certain activities and left the determination of those activities to the factfinder.78 Ultimately, the most important aspect of Higgins was the Court's

endorsement of the reasoning employed by the Board of Tax Appeals in
discerning a trade or business.
Congress reacted to Higgins by enacting section 23(a)(2), the predecessor
of section 212, to correct the perceived inequitable treatment of expenses incurred in the management of property held for the production of income.79

Significantly, such expenses were made deductible by adoption of a new
statute and not by modification of the original definitions of a trade or busi-

ness. The Higgins rule remains that a trade or business requires not only activities carried on for profit, but such profit or income must also be primarily
attributable to the activities.
Higgins had its most immediate impact on the tax treatment of losses
arising from bad debts, and it is here that the preferred reading of Higgins is
corroborated, albeit from a slightly different perspective. The distinction

largely dissolved by Congress in the enactment of section 23(a)(2) was strategically preserved in the simultaneous enactment of section 166.80 Section 166
76.

Id. at 217.

77. Id. at 217 (footnote omitted) (quoting Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 169

(1911)).
78. See 812 U.S. 212, 218 (1941), where the Court stated:
The petitioner merely kept records and collected interest and dividends from his
securities through managerial attention for his investments. No matter how large the
estate or how continuous or extended the work required may be, such facts are not
sufficient as a matter of law to permit the courts to reverse the decision of the Board.
Its conclusion is adequately supported by this record, and rests upon a conception of

carrying on business similar to that expressed by this Court for an antecedent section.
(emphasis added).
79. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 121(a), 56 Stat. 798, 819 (1942). I.R.C. § 28(a)(2) (1989)
was redesignated as § 212 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
80. I.R.C. § 28(k)(4) (1989) was redesignated as § 166 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954. Section 28(a)(2) of the 1989 Code, which responded to Higgins by allowing deductions
for certain non-trade or business expenses, and § 28(k)(4) of the 1989 Code were originally
enacted simultaneously in the Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 121(a), § 124(a), 56 Stat. 798,
819, 820-21 (1942). The legislative history of the latter provisions clearly evidences an intent
to preserve the narrow meaning of trade, or business as defined in § 28(e)(1) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1989, which allowed certain losses sustained in a trade or business. See
H.R. REP. No. 2888, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 76-78 (1942), reprinted in 1 J.SEEMAN, supra note
29, at 1953. The simultaneous enactment of this provision supports the contention that
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allows short-term capital loss treatment for non-business bad debts, but accords preferred ordinary loss treatment to bad debts incurred in a trade or
business. 8 '
Among the most frequently litigated issues regarding section 166 has been
the tax treatment of loans made by a majority or one hundred percent shareholder to a closely held corporation. In Whipple v. Commissioner,82 the tax-

payer owned eighty percent of the stock of Mission Orange Bottling Company. 3 He then purchased the assets of a sole proprietorship engaged in the
bottling business, and acquired a franchise to produce, bottle, and distribute
certain beverages.8 4 Subsequently, he transferred the operating assets to
Mission Orange and operated the business in corporate form. The taxpayer
made sizable cash advances to the corporation and these debts of the corporation eventually became worthless. 85 In computing his taxable income, the taxpayer deducted the amounts due as business bad debts.8 6 The Commissioner
disallowed the deduction on grounds that the debt was a nonbusiness bad
debt.87 The Tax Court sustained the Commissioner,8 and the United States
Supreme Court affirmed. 89
In its opinion, the Supreme Court narrowly focused on the taxpayer's cash
advances to determine whether his income arose from such advances or whether
his loan activity was peripheral to other activities which actually generated
the income. As in Higgins, the Court in Whipple concluded that mere return
on an investment does not constitute being engaged in a trade or business. 90
Congress was at least aware of the decision in Higgins, if not intent on incorporating its
holding into similar language employed elsewhere in the Code.
81. I.R.C. § 166 (1982).
82. 373 U.S. 193, reh'g denied, 374 U.S. 858 (1963).
83. 373 U.S. at 196 n.4.
84. Id. at 195.
85. Id. at 196.
86.

Id. at 196-97.

87. Id. at 197. The statute provided differential treatment for business and non-business
bad debts. The latter was deductible as a short-term capital loss while the former suffered
no such restriction. See I.R.C. § 23(k)(1),

(4) (1939). Substantially similar treatment exists

under current law. See I.R.C. § 166 (1982).
88. 378 U.S. at 197.
89. Id. at 203.
90. The Court stated, in part:
Devoting one's time and energies to the affairs of a corporation is not of itself, and
without more, a trade or business of the person so engaged .... When the only return
is that of an investor, the taxpayer has not satisfied his burden of demonstrating that
he is engaged in a trade or business since investing is not a trade or busines and the
return to the taxpayer, though substantially the product of his services, legally arises
not from his own trade or business but from that of the corporation.
Id. at 202.
91. The Court distinguished a scenario involving service to many corporations:
[T~he presence of more than one corporation might lend support to a finding that the
taxpayer was engaged in a regular course of promoting corporations for a fee or commission . . . or for a profit on their sale , . . but in such cases there is compensation
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Full time service to a corporation, by itself, does not amount to a trade or
business since a taxpayer's return arises not from his own business but from
the corporate enterprise. 91
Higgins and Whipple thus disclose the fundamental nature of business as
"activity" and highlight the requisite relationship between activity and the
production of income. The separateness of the corporation as a legal entity
provides a useful vehicle in these cases for determining whether the taxpayer
acts as an investor or an employee-proprietor. 92 Unfortunately, however, Higgins and Whipple are often viewed as decisions significant only in the shareholder-corporation context. 93 Their broad principles, though, surface in other
areas of the Internal Revenue Code and raise difficult factual questions as to
whether a single taxpayer who performs activities and receives a return on his
capital establishes the requisite connectedness between the two. 94 Such analysis
is the pillar upon which a trade or business is constructed.
other than the normal investor's return, income received directly for his own services
ratherthan indirectly through the corporateenterprise....

Id. at 202-03 (emphasis added).
92. Generally, corporations are considered taxable entities. See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(4), (1)
(1982). They are taxpayers separate and apart from their shareholders. Their separateness
for tax purposes survives even though the shareholders maintain a beneficial interest in the
corporate assets and receive compensation for the use of those assets through dividends.
However, the shareholders surrender direct control over and activity with respect to the
assets as they are insulated from the assets by corporate form. In contrast, a noncorporate
owner holds the assets directly and can, therefore, affect the assets. The latter calls on a
measure of the activity while the former absolutely forecloses it.
93. Cf. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. Retirement Fund v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 96, 99
(1961).
94. Determination of whether a taxpayer is engaged in a trade or business is pivotal in
other provisions of the Internal Revenue Code and analysis there should be consistent.
Section 1231 allows preferred tax treatment for gains and losses on dispositions of property
used in a trade or business, subject to an allowance for depreciation. I.R.C. § 1231(a), (b)
(1982). Originally, the House extended this favorable treatment to "depreciable property,"
which included both property used in a trade or business and property held for the production of income. (Cite house bill). Seidmans, Vol. 1 P.1817. However, the Senate limited the
provision to depreciable property and it remained so upon enactment. See § 322(c)(3). Revenue Act of 1951, 65 Stat. 452. Thus, congressional awareness of the business versus investment distinction is implicit and, absent a specific definition of trade or business, case law
interpreting that term under § 1231 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 should be consistent with similar issues under §§ 162 and 513 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
Case law under § 1231 has regarded "activities" as the acid test of a trade or business. See
Fackler v. Commissioner, 133 F.2d 509 (6th Cir. 1943) (rendering of personal services with
respect to a leasehold characterizes a gain on the sale of the leasehold as ordinary gains
under prior provisions defining capital asset in years before enactment of the predecessor of
I.R.C. § 1231 (1954); Leland Hazard v. C.I.R., 7 T.C. 372 (1946) (enactment of I.R.C.
§ 1170) (1939) [curently I.R.C. § 1231 (1982)] was not intended to change precedental value
of Fackler in determining whether property is used in a trade or business); Stephen P.
Wasnok, 30 T.C.M. 39 (1971) ("activity in renting" estabilshed a trade or business).
Where no interposing corporate entity is involved, the cases interpreting § 1231 essentially
resolve two issues. First, they determine whether the activities are related to the source 'of
the income, a component of which is passive rentals. Second, they address whether the activities are sufficient to consume the underlying capital in such a way as to convert the entire
enterprise into a trade or business. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-4(b)(5)(iv) (1976) (passive rentals
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A Reinterpretationof Section 513(c)
If section 513(c) is read meaningfully, it incorporates the interpretation of
trade or business advanced by the Supreme Court in Stone Tracy Co., Higgins
and Whipple. The first sentence of section 513(c) is a shorthand expression for
100 years of judicial interpretation: "For purposes of this section, the term
'trade or business' includes any activity which is carried on for the production
of income from the sale of goods or performance of services." 95 The statutory
recipe calls for both activity and the essential link between the activity and
the production of income. This latter requirement, mandated by the Supreme
Court in Higgins and Whipple, is impregnated within the single word
9
"from.",
]RLEGULARLY CARRIED ON

Unrelated business taxable income arises only from those unrelated trades
or businesses which are regularly carried onY7 To determine whether the
"regularly carried on" requirement is satisfied, Treasury Regulation section
1.512-1(c) 9s calls for an inquiry into "the frequency and continuity with which
the activities productive of the income are conducted and the manner in
which they are pursued."9 9 The Treasury's interpretation suggests the first
inquiry is addressed to the normal time span of the activities. Where the income producing activities of a nonexempt commercial organizations are
normally conducted on a year-round basis, the conduct of such activities by an
exempt organization for only a few weeks does not constitute the regular
carrying on of a trade or business. 00 Even if the time span of the activities
does not parallel that of commercial endeavors, activities may yet be regularly carried on if conducted with competitive and promotional efforts typical
of commercial endeavors.l 0l In such instances, the manner of the conduct,
as under current statute do not include payments for the use of personal property when
significant services are rendered in connection with payments). See also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8321060
(application of Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-4(b)(5)(iv) (1976)). Washburn v. Commissioner, 51 F.2d
949 (8th Cir. 1931). Finally, the trade or business issue is also prominent in determining the
taxation of foreign persons where it is held there must be activity which is continuous and
regular. See I.R.C. § 864 (1982).
95. I.R.C. § 513(c) (1982) (emphasis added).
96. Id. However, profit motive as opposed to actual profit should be determinative. Cf. id.
§ 183 (1954).
97. Id. § 512(a)(1) (1982).
98. Treas. Reg. § 1.512-1(c) (1967). Guidance from the Treasury is critical in this regard
since § 512(a)(1) imposes the "regularly carried on" requirement without further definition.
99. These regulations find general support in the legislative history.
Thus, in determining whether the income of an exempt organization from a trade or
business is subject to the Supplement U tax, it is first necessary to determine whether
it is income from a trade or business which is regularly carried on, or is income from
a sporadic activity.
H.R. REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 109 (1950).
100. If such commercial activities are inherently seasonal, the relevant time frame is the
season rather than the entire year. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(c)(2)(i) (1967).
101. Id. § 1.513-1(c)(2)(ii).
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despite the temporal incongruity, assumes tantamount importance. Some
activities, though, may be so infrequent that neither their manner nor their
10 2
recurrence will establish them as a trade or business regularly carried on.
While the Treasury regulations acknowledge the importance of the "regularly carried on" requirement, only recently has the Tax Court accorded the
requirement meaning independent of finding a trade or business. In Suffolk
County Patrolmen'sBenevolent Association, Inc. v. Commissioner,0 3 a New
York nonprofit corporation whose membership consisted of local law enforcement officers, sponsored vaudeville shows in conjunction with a theatrical
producer as a means of fundraising. The Patrolmen's Benevolent Association
(PBA) received twenty-eight percent of gross advertising revenues and fifty
percent of ticket revenues from six consecutive annual performances. 0 The
105
majority of revenues received were attributable to advertising.
The Commissioner determined PBA's fundraising activities constituted an
unrelated trade or business regularly carried on and assessed deficiencies based
on the revenues received from ticket sales and advertising. PBA conceded the
fundraising activity was unrelated to its exempt purpose, but contended it was
not engaged in a trade or business and, more importantly, that its activity was
not regularly carried on. 00 Based on the legislative history of section 512 and
the regulations promulgated thereunder, the Tax Court determined that
PBA's intermittent activities were "regularly carried on," notwithstanding
their annually recurring nature. 0 7 In reaching this determination, the court
specifically rejected four contentions of the Commissioner.
The Commissioner initially argued that taxpayer's activities were regularly
carried on because they were commercially and systematically carried on by a
professional organization under contract for six years. 08 Two separate arguments are incorporated here, either of which would establish the activity as
"regularly carried on" under the pertinent regulations. On one ground, the
102. Id. 1.513-1(c)(2)(iii).
103. 77 T.C. 1314 (1981).
104. Id. at 1316.
105. Id. at 1318. Even if each performance was sold out, maximum ticket revenues for a
year would not exceed $20,000. This amount would have been insufficient to cover production
costs. Id. at 1818 n.7.
106. Id. at 1319.
107. Id. at 1321. Despite their annual recurrence, the Tax Court believed the activities
were sporadic and thus not regularly carried on. Id. Support for this position was found in
S. RP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 106-07 (1950), reprinted in 1950 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
Naws 3165, which reads:
If a charitable organization, exempt under section 101(6) [now § 501(c)] of the code,
gives an occasional dance to which the public is admitted for a charge, hiring an
orchestra and entertainers for the purpose, this would not be a trade or business regularly carried on within the meaning of section 422. Likewise, an organization which
operates a sandwich stand during the week of an annual county fair is not regularly
carrying on as a trade or business.
(quoted by Tax Court, 77 T.C. at 1321). Similar support was found in Treas. Reg. § 1.515l(c)(2)(ii) (1967), which describes an annual dance as sporadic activity. 77 T.C. at 1321.
108. 77 T.C. at 1322.
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Commissioner stated that a contract covering six years constitutes the type of
"duration of the event" which the regulations classified as regularly carried
on. 10 9 The Tax Court disagreed, finding that the annually recurrent nature
of an activity does not necessarily establish it as regularly carried on. 110 The
court thus implied that the relevant time frame for evaluating the activity is
the single year in question. Both the regulations and the legislative history of
section 512 support this analysis."' On a separate ground, the Commissioner
alleged that under the regulations even intermittent activities may be regularly carried on if executed in a commercial manner. 11- The Commissioner
argued that the contracts with a professional organization to produce and
promote the shows established such a commercial nature. The Tax Court rejected this contention and stated that the mere use of professionals in a fundraiser does not establish the activity as regularly carried on."15
Secondly, the Commissioner argued that the eight to sixteen weeks per
year" 1 spent in negotiating and organizing the fundraising event were an
essential part of the activity and should be included in determining the frequency of the activity. Thus, according to the Commissioner, the PBA's "activity" was not merely a single annual event, but one which consumed up to
four months of each year. The Tax Court disagreed, finding that the regulations and legislative history mention only the duration of the event as the
relevant time frame. Planning and preparation by the taxpayer therefore
should not affect the tax treatment of income derived from the fundraising
venture." 5
The Tax Court's apparent redefinition of "activities" is problematic. Treasury Regulation section 1.513-1(c)(1) implies that "activities" are those constituting the unrelated trade or business. Thus the time span of the activities
should be determined by first identifying all the constituent activities of the
questioned venture and then measuring the time span from the beginning of
the first activity to the completion of the last. In looking only to the consummating or realizing event, the Tax Court's approach ignores the broader
dimensions of the trade or business. 1 6 On the other hand, the Tax Court's
interpretation may find support in the language of the regulation which speaks
of "activities productive of income." This could be read as authorizing a
narrower focus on only the income-consummating activities of the unrelated
trade or business. Yet, severing preparatory activities, which are an ordinary
and necessary element of a business regularly carried on, from the meaning of
109. See Txeas. Reg. § 1.513-1(c)(2)(i) (1967).
110. 77 T.C. at 1322-23.
111. See Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(c)(2)(i) (1967) (suggesting the proper perspective for
evaluating activities is the year).
112. See Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(c)(2)(ii) (1967).
113. 77 T.C. at 1323.
114. Id. There was contradictory evidence regarding the amount of time actually spent
in preparation. The court determined that "8 to 16 weeks was the approximate time from
the beginning of solicitation to the actual performance." Id. at 1323 n.11.
115. Id. at 1323.
116. I.R.C. § 512(a)(1) (1982) (attention is drawn here to "activities," not actual sales or
income - consummating events).
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"business" enervates section 162. Thus- "business" should be read to include
preparatory activities to the extent such activities generate deductible expenses
under section 162. This approach would considerably expand the perspective
for evaluating whether such activities are regularly carried on.
In his third argument, the Commissioner contended that the size of the
promoter's advertising staff brought the activity within the regularly carried
on requirement. The Tax Court again disagreed, finding neither the size nor
the expertise of the advertising staff a controlling factor in determining
whether the activity was regularly carried on.".- The court, however, should
have found the size and expertise of the advertising staff to be probative of
commercial manner. To cater to each of the towns in the county, the staff
published five separate editions of the program. If these separate editions resulted from the tacit demand of local advertisers, rather than from noncommercial demographics, commercial manner would seem to be present. The taxpayer most likely won this point, though, when the Commissioner agreed to
view the vaudeville show and the solicitation of advertising as a single inseparable activity." s Had the advertising activity been examined alone, its
commercial manner would have been considerably more obvious to the court.
For this reason, the court's holding as it relates to advertising should be relied
upon with caution. Similar facts could rally for the Commissioner in a subsequent case, and the court could distinguish Suffolk County on the factual
ground that the advertising activity there was not evaluated as a separate
activity.
Finally, the Commissioner contended that Revenue Ruling 73-424 applied
to taxpayer's activities."19 That Ruling held that income from the distribution
of an annual yearbook containing paid advertising was UBTI. 120 The Tax
Court, however, found Revenue Ruling 75-201121 more similar to the instant
situation. In this latter ruling, the Internal Revenue Service held that the
distribution of an annual concert book containing paid advertising to patrons
at an annual fundraising ball did not produce UBTI.122 The court distinguished the earlier ruling by pointing out that the yearbook was not distributed in connection with a fundraising event. 23 Thus, the umbrella of an
exempt function can sometimes shelter otherwise unrelated business taxable
income.
Suffolk County confirms the substance of the previously untested meaning
of "regularly carried on." It ratifies the painfully reductionistic approach of
the regulations, and illustrates how the factfinder can discount or nullify the
117. 77 T.C. at 1324.
118.

See id. at 1322 n.10.

119. Rev. Rul. 73-424, 1973-2 C.B. 190.
120. Id. at 191. The facts of this ruling involved a commercially controlled advertising
solicitation program of three months duration.
121. Rev. Rul. 75-201, 1975-1 C.B. 164.
122. Id. The Tax Court noted that the only difference between the facts of Rev. Rul.
75-201 and those of the instant case was that the former involved voluntary solicitation,
while the latter was professional. 77 T.C. at 1325. However, the court had already found this

to be an untenable distinction. See supra text accompanying note 117.
123.

77 T.C. at 1325.
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significance of activities. More important, though, is its holding that "regularly carried on" is not a shadow of the trade or business requirement, but
rather is an independent standard capable of limiting the number of trades or
businesses classified as generating UBTI.
Despite the holding in Suffolk County the significance of the "regularly
carried on" requirement remains somewhat ill-defined with regards to a
qualified trust. No statutory authority for disparate treatment exists, but a
qualified trust is not ordinarily characterized by those factual activities illustrated in the regulations, such as fundraisers, annual dances, or advertising.
Notwithstanding these factual incongruities, the policy of the provision is to
exempt income from tax even where it is derived from an unrelated trade or
business provided that trade or business does not attain a certain level of
regularity. In other words, activity must overcome two hurdles to be subject to
the UBTI tax. First, it must satisfy both a qualitative and quantitative threshold to establish a trade or business. Once established, the business itself must
then meet an additional quantitative level to be regularly carried on. Viewed
at this fundamental policy level, no inconsistency exists in analyzing qualified
trusts by the same abstract criteria: frequency, duration, and commercial
manner.
MODIFICATIONS OF SECTION 512(b)

Once an activity is characterized as an unrelated trade or business regularly carried on, the tax base is derived by adjusting the gross income attributable to the trade or business with the deductions allowed under chapter 1
of the Internal Revenue Code and the applicable exceptions in subsection
512(b). 124 The most important of these adjustments are the passive investment
124. See Treas. Reg. § 1.512(a)-I, T.D. 7438, 1976-2 C.B. 156 (rules for allocating deductions between exempt and non-exempt income).
125. See I.R.C. § 512(b)(1) to (3) (1982). Section 512(b) lists 15 definitional paragraphs
describing adjustments to be made in computing UBTI as defined in § 512(a)(1). Of these 15
paragraphs, only the first three are critically examined in this paper. The remaining adjustments, although they do not generally threaten the mechanics of UBTI, are worthy of
brief mention.
Paragraph 4 of § 512(b) adds to gross income from an unrelated trade or business the
income derived from debt-financed property. Congress has chosen to tax the income from
such property in accordance with a ratio of acquisitions indebtedness to the total adjusted
basis. See 4 B. BITTKER, supra note 26, ff 103.4. Although its complexities are beyond the
scope of this article, it should not be overlooked as its application is considerably broader
than §§ 511 through 513.
Paragraph 5 excludes nontrade or business conversions or liquidations of property, thus
insuring that capital gains reaped on traditional investment activity will not be shared by
UBTI. See supra note 29 (legislative history of the Revenue Act of 1950). Paragraph 6 allows
a net operating loss deduction, btt adjusts it to include only excess deductions allowed under
part III in computing UBTI. The rule prevents the tax benefit arising from a carryover of
deductions which would otherwise be attributable to tax-exempt income from offsetting
UBTI in a later or earlier year.
Paragraphs 7 through 9 provide for the exclusion of income and deductions attributable
to research. Paragraph 7 grants the exclusion if the research is performed for the United
States or any state or political subdivision thereof. Paragraph 8 provides a similar rule for
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exceptions listed in subsections 512(b)(1) through- (3), as they frequently
present constructional problems in determining UBTI. 125 This analysis, therefore, will focus principally on these provisions.
The PassiveInvestment Modifications
Subsections 512(b)(1) through (3) exclude from the gross income of an unrelated trade or business regularly carried on certain forms of traditionally
passive investment income. Subsection (b)(1) excludes dividends, interest,
annuities and payments with respect to security loans. Subsection (b)(2) excludes certain royalties and 512(b)(3) excludes certain rents. Although the
pertinent Treasury regulations 26 interpret these provisions to some extent,
this discussion will focus on the purpose of the section 512(b) modifications
and their interaction with UBTI. The appropriate starting point is the section's legislative history.
The exclusions enumerated in section 512(b)(1) through (3) arose concurrently in 1950 with the inception of the tax on UBTI. 1 27 In the original
legislation, Congress acknowledged that "trade or business" was to assume the
same meaning it had in section 162.1s In addition, all dividends, interest, annuities, and royalties were to be excluded from unrelated business taxable income. 29 These exclusions were not, however, depicted as dispositive of
colleges, universities and hospitals. Paragraph 9 does not place limits on the party for whom
the research may be performed, but is narrower in the sense that it pertains only to fundamental research freely available to the public. In each of these adjustments, the element of
restriction mirrors a general policy of public benefit as grounds for exclusion.
Paragraphs 10 and 11 allow certain deductions. Paragraph 10 severely xestricts the charitable deduction to 10%. In so doing, it prevents the charitable deduction from indirectly
exempting income merely because it is funneled to a charitable entity. Paragraph 11 provides for a standard deduction of $1,000 to be applied against UBTI.
Paragraph 13 contains a cryptic formula designed to foreclose the common ruse whereby
an exempt organization transfers business assets to a controlled subsidiary and thereafter
collects substantially all the pre-tax profits as a payment of rent. The consequence was
complete avoidance of tax by the exempt organization with only a minimal tax to the
subsidiary, due to its corresponding § 162 deduction. Paragraph 13 remedies the situation
by imputing the income, according to its prescribed ratio, back to the controlling exempt
organization. This paragraph does, however, add a disturbing ambiguity to § 513(b). Suppose a qualified trust or other exempt entity only receives rents from a controled subsidiary
and thus has no trade or business. No gross income would then be present from an unrelated trade or business regularly carried on, and one might reasonably assume the modifications of § 512(b) are therefore irrelevant. Section 512(b)(13) suggests it can stand on its
own, however, and thus departs from a pure statutory analysis of part III. This problem,
along with a similar circumstance in § 512(b)(3), seems to have emerged from some ambiguous
legislative history of the Tax Reform Act of 1969. It will be discussed more generally in
conjunction with § 512(b)(3). See infra notes 139-42 and accompanying text.
Finally, paragraphs 14 and 15 are limited in application to activities of certain religious
orders and educational institutions and are therefore irrelevant to the tax exempt status of
a qualified trust.
126. See Treas. Reg. §-1.512(b)-I, T.D. 7767, 1981-1 C.B. 82.
127. The counterpart provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 were § 422(a)(1)

through (3).
128. See supra note 36 ("trade or business" has the same meaning as in I.R.C. § 162).
129. H.R. REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 110 (1950); S.REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d
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the trade or business issue. Moreover, they were not to affect section 162 as the
proper test for determining the presence of a trade or business. Instead, the
congressional discussion evidenced protective concern for educational institutions which historically received interest, dividends, and royalties from investment of their endowments.130 These transactions were accorded unequivocal
legitimacy and granted safe harbor treatment.
The legislative history thus suggests that the section 512(b) modifications
were enacted to remove the enumerated types of passive income from the unrelated business income tax base. This interpretation is logical since without
the modifications the passive income loses its character once it becomes
suspended in the solution of a trade or business. For example, assume a taxpayer has purely passive rental income of $2,000 in a given year from a real
estate investment. The taxpayer incurs no UBTI, not because of the modifications under section 512(b), but because there is no trade or business. If, however, the taxpayer had performed substantial services with respect to the rental
of the property and derives $4,000 of income, the taxpayer would have been
engaged in the trade or business of renting property. Taxpayer now has $4,000
of income derived from a trade or business of which S2,000 is attributable to
rent.1 3 1 Assuming the trade or business was regularly carried on and unrelated,

the UBTI would be $4,000 and the tax base would likewise be S4,000. To
insure that such rents would not be taxed, Congress created a statutory power
to extract the otherwise passive rents from the tax base of the unrelated trade
or business. The resultant unrelated business taxable income is $2,000.
Without this salvage function of section 512(b)(1), an exempt organization
would incur a tax upon revenues otherwise exempt simply because that income was derived from a trade or business. Yet, Congress was also concerned
with giving tax-exempt organizations a competitive edge over commercial
competitors by exempting from tax all of the former organization's revenue
including income from an "unrelated trade or business." 132 Therefore, section
512(b) struck a balance by taxing to prevent unfair competition and granting
33
an exempt entity the usual benefits of tax exemption.1
The section effects this legislative policy by applying the modifications to
Sess. 115 (1950), reprinted in 1950 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3166, and in II J. SEIDM AN,
supra note 29, at 2344-49.
130. See 96 CONC. REC. 936 (1950) (statement of Mr. Coombs noting the importance of
interest, dividends and royalties to colleges and charities).
131. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. The passive rentals become a homogenized
component of the business and are lost but for I.R.C. § 512(b)(3) (1982).
132. See supra note 34.
133. See S. REP. No. 2375, 31st Cong., 2d Sess. 108 (1950), reprinted in 1950 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 3053, 3167 ("i[the term 'rents from real property' does not include income
from the operation of a hotel but does include rents derived from a lease of the hotel
itself"). Id. at 30-31, reprinted in 1950 U.S. CODE CONG. 9- AD. NEws 3053, 3083. "Dividends,
interest, royalties, most rents, capital gains and losses and similar items are excluded from
the base of the tax on unrelated income because your committee believes that they are
'passive' in character and are not likely to result in serious competition for taxable businesses
having similar income. Moreover, investment-producing incomes of these types have long
been xecognized as a proper source of revenue for educational and charitable organizations
and trusts."
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gross income derived from an unrelated trade or business regularly carried on.
Under this procedure, all income from an unrelated trade or business is included in gross income and then certain exceptions are carved out. Although
Congress sought to balance the polar interests of tax exemption and unfair
competition, it preferred to err in favor of the latter. It was impractical, if
not impossible, to list every possible passive investment which, by commingling
with activity, could become a trade or business. Congress therefore addressed
the major areas and sacrificed the remainder for the sake of expediency.
The Internal Revenue Service has steadfastly adhered to section 512(b) in
excluding certain receipts from UBTI. In Revenue Ruling 79-349,134 a qualified trust was engaged in the unrelated trade or business of providing mortgage
loans. This unrelated trade or business met the regularly carried on requirement because both the volume and manner of the loan activity were comparable to similar activities of commercial institutions. The lending activities were
conducted throughout the year on a competitive basis with commercial institutions, and the hundreds of loan applications were screened by a committee
of attorneys, accountants, and other trust personnel. Income of the trust arising from this unrelated trade or business consisted both of interest and
screening service receipts. 3 5 Although the trust was engaged in the business of
lending money and the interest income flowed from the conduct of a trade or
business, the
Service excluded the interest from UBTI pursuant to section
s

512(b)(1). "

Although this ruling is supported by the statute, 37 it contravenes the
policy of preventing unfair competition, particularly with respect to nonexempt financial institutions. Furthermore, it is questionable whether Congress,
in adopting an interest exemption, anticipated the commercial lending of
money by exempt organizations. When the UBTI tax was first enacted,
qualified trusts were neither subject to subchapter F, 38 nor did they have the
fund of wealth they currently possess. The ruling, however, is secure in its
statutory analysis and application, notwithstanding the alienation of qualified
trusts from the legislative history underpinning the UBTI tax.
Interpretive problems frequently arise in applying the section 512(b) modifications in the context of personal property leasing. These difficulties stem
from improper analysis of the statutory provisions and uncertainty regarding
the effect of ambiguous legislative history. Originally, rents from personal
property were excluded from UBTI provided the personal property was leased
with real property. In the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Congress amended section
512(b)(3) to exclude rents from personal property only if they constituted an
"incidental" amount of the total rents received under a lease. 3 9 The policy
behind the amendment is described in the Senate Report:
184. Rev. Rul. 79-849, 1979-2 CXB. 233.
185. Id. at 234.
136. Id. The Service did state, however, that the screening service receipts must be included in the computation of UBTI. Id. at 234-35.
137. The ruling is also partially supported by legislative history. See supra note 133.
138. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
139. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 121(b), 83 Stat. 487, 538 (1969).
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These amendments are intended to prevent an escape from the tax on
unrelated business income in those cases where an exempt organization
owns an operating business but leases the business assets to an independent management company. In such a case it receives most of the
profits from the business in the form of "passive rents" and comes under
the existing
exclusion from real property and personalty leased with real
property. 140
Congress simultaneously enacted section 512(b)(13), which adds to UBTI certain income from controlled corporations. 141 This section is founded on a
similar intent to prevent leasing of personal property to a subsidiary as a
means of avoiding UBTI.
Although the statute seeks to foreclose indirect forms of engaging in business, it does not purport to convert all rentals from personalty into UBTI.
The provision is misleading, however, since it impliedly ignores the antecedent
issue; whether a particular rental of personalty constitutes a trade or business.
Such ambiguity does not defend an abandonment of the trade or business
issue, but rather invites the judiciary to reconcile a conflicting statute in a
manner respectful to its conflicting purposes. 142 That interpretation, to include
rents from personalty in UBTI, should be limited to the circumstances characteristic of the targeted evil: ownership by the exempt organization of an
operating business combined with a leasing of the assets to a separate management company. The statutory analysis may be strained to accommodate this
singular result, but should not be otherwise aborted.
Cooper Tire & Rubber Company Employees'
Retirement Fund v. Commissioner
The leading Tax Court opinion directly addressing the application of UBTI
to a qualified trust is Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. Employees' Retirement Fund
v. Commissioner.143 In that case, a qualified trust purchased twenty tire manu140. S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 69 (1969), reprinted in 1969-3 C.B. 423, 468,
and in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2027, 2098.
141. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 121(b), 83 Stat. 487, 539. The original
designation for this section was 512(b)(15), but it was redesignated 512(b)(13) by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1951(b)(8)(A), 90 Stat. 1520, 1839.
142. If Congress had desired to snare all forms of income but those enunciated in
§ 512(b), then it should have dispensed with the "trade or business" restriction. However, the
"trade or business" issue was not discussed. The product is a statute which is clear on its
face, but unclear in its effect due to ambiguous and possibly contradictory legislative history.
Since the purpose of UBTI was to establish tax parity, it seems the statutory prescription
should receive a greater allegiance since "trade or business" is the event which Congress
originally conceived as triggering the application of the tax. A leap to the § 512(b) modifications ignores this threshold test and depicts the tax on UBTI as an effort to police the
income producing activity of exempt organizations and qualified trusts through excise taxes.
See I.R.C. §§ 4911-4948, 4971-4975 (1982). Therefore, arguments that the Tax Reform Act of
1969 places primary importance on § 512(b) by establishing a few permissible sources of
income are inappropriate, notwithstanding some ambiguous legislative history, because
Congress has presumably established different policies in §§ 511-513 and §§ 4911-4948, and
they should not be cross-pollinated.
143. 36 T.C. 96 (1961), aff'd per curiam, 306 F.2d 20 (6th Cir. 1962).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol35/iss5/7

22

Shirley: The Effect of Unrelated Business Taxable Income on the Tax Exempt
1983],

TAX EXEMPT TRUST'S TAXABLE INCOME

facturing macbilues and leased them to the employer for a ten-year term. The
employer-lessee bore the risk of proper performance of the machines in addition to the burden and expense of installation. 44 The Commissioner contended the rental payments received by the trust were unrelated business
taxable income and accordingly, assessed a deficiency.
The taxpayer claimed the rental payments were not UBTI because the
leasing venture was not a trade or business. The taxpayer asserted that a
single leasing venture which imposes no duties upon the lessor other than the
collection of rents does not constitute a trade or business. Rejecting this argument, the Tax Court noted that under section 162 even a single transaction
can establish a trade or business.145 The taxpayer also contended that the
rental income was passive, like the passive investment in securities in Higgins
v. Commissioner,'" and not a return from the operation of a trade or business.
The court, however, distinguished Higgins and found that, unlike investments
in securities, investments in personal property can produce income only if the
property is used, rented or sold. In addition, the amount of money invested
by the trust, the purchase of the machines with borrowed funds, and the term
47
of the lease were important factors indicating a business activity.
In arriving at these conclusions, the Tax Court examined the legislative
intent of the statutes pertaining to unrelated business taxable income. Focusing
on section 512(b)(3), the court stated "the statute specifically excluded from
unrelated business [taxable] income, rentals from real property and rental
from personal property when 'leased with real property' but [was] silent as to
such exclusion when only the personal property is leased."' -8 Rather than
first determining whether a trade or business even existed, the court inferred
that section 512(b) was the appropriate starting point for resolving the issue.
Unfortunately, this interpretation of section 512(b) as an exclusive itemization
of exempt income poisoned the remainder of the court's analysis with mere
afterthought.
The Cooper Tire court's interpretation of the policy and mechanical deviations of UBTI contains serious flaws. First, the court's notion of the function
of section 512(b) in determining UBTI is troublesome. Although rentals from
personalty alone are clearly excluded from the statutory modifications, no
support exists for the conclusion that all rents from the use of personal property are to be taxed. If analyzed in light of the salvage function of section
512(b), the proper conclusion is that Congress guarantees tax exemption to
certain receipts, such as those for the use of real property, but not to rents for
personalty when they are a constituent of a trade or business.
Secondly, the court's construction of legislative intent forecloses an adequate definitional analysis of "trade or business." The court's conclusion that
investments in personalty produce income only if used, rented or sold implies
144. Id. at 97. •

145. Id. at 100-01. Although no cases were cited involving rental of personalty, the court
supported its conclusion by analogy to cases involving rental of realty.
146. 312 U.S. 212, reh'g denied, 312 U.S. 714 (1941).
147. 36 T.C. at 101.
148.

Id. at 99.
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that such activities actually convert passive rents to income from a trade or
business. In this respect, the court's narrow reading of Higgins is unsettling.
Higgins does not establish a legal principle that applies only to securities. Instead, the nature of indirect ownership evidenced by stock and proper regard
for the corporate entity allowed the Supreme Court to draw clear lines in
evaluating activity as the source of income. The same principles apply when
income-producing assets are owned directly, but the analysis is more strained
as the court must evaluate the activities of a single taxpayer. Nonetheless, the
approach is well-established and should likewise apply for purposes of determining unrelated business taxable income.149 The Tax Court admitted the
need for "activity" but overlooked significant questions regarding the amount
of activity required, the number of rental solicitations that must be made, and
the volume of property that must be sold. If a single rental always constitutes
sufficient activity, then "passive rent" is a contradiction in terms.
Finally, the court found the debt-financed acquisition of the property
probative of a trade or business. 150 The court was concerned that Congress
had withdrawn exemption for income from rentals on certain debt-financed
realty but had ignored similar provisions for debt-financed leases of personalty.'15 The court refused to interpret this congressional silence as an intent
to exempt income from debt-financed leases of personalty. This portion of the
court's opinion became obsolete with the adoption of section 514 which ad5 2
dresses debt-financed acquisitions of both real and personal property.
CONCLUSION

Exempt organizations, including qualified trusts, are subject to a tax on
their unrelated business taxable income. The congressional intent in enacting
the UBTI provisions was to remove the competitive edge of an exempt entity
vis-a-vig a non-exempt entit.y. Congress did not choose to invoke this tax
unilaterally, but rather targeted only those income-producing activities of an
exempt organization which consituted an unrelated trade or business regularly carried on.
A qualified trust is engaged in an unrelated trade or business when it is
engaged in any trade or business.1 53 Trade or business as defined in section
513(c) is a reflection of case law that has arisen under section 162 and other
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. These definitions distinguish a
"trade or business" from other passive investments by the "activity" characteristic of the former and connectedness of that activity to the source of the
income.
The trade or business inquiry is a two-step process. First, one must determine whether the activity can by its very nature generate income. Regardless
of the amount of activity, shareholders cannot establish a trade or business
149. See supra note 94 and accompanying text for a discussion of "trade or business"
and its formulation.
150. 36 T.C. at 101. This is a curious statement if viewed from the perspective of § 162.
151. Id. at 100.
152. I.R.C. § 514 (1982).

153. Id. § 513(b).
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through mere investment, unless they attain dealer status. Otherwise, the frequency of their investment activity will be insignificant because the chief
source of income, the dividend, is deemed to be the activity of the corporation,
not the taxpayer. If assets are owned directly and qualitative issues have been
overcome, the next evaluation of activity becomes quantitative. One must
determine what volume of activity is required to convert the passive holding
of property into the business of renting property. Assuming an unrelated trade
or business is found, the second requirement is that such trade or business be
regularly carried on. An evaluation of the timespan and manner of a trade or
business is essential. Under case law thus far, a single annual activity generally
will not be considered "regularly carried on."
Even if the two-steps are met, not all income of an unrelated trade or business regularly carried on will be subject to tax. Subsections 512(b)(1) through
(3)
will exclude from the gross income of the trade or business income from
certain traditionally passive sources. Exclusion of these receipts connotes a
congressional desire to guarantee tax exemption to income from such passive
sources notwithstanding immersion of the source in a business solution. Constructional problems regarding these modifications may arise in the context
of personal property rentals. The threshold issue, however, is whether the
activity constitutes a trade or business. Only upon an affirmative finding will
the modifications be applied to determine the appropriate tax liability.
The statutory determination of unrelated business taxable income might
profit from congressional reconsideration, especially with respect to the trade
or business requirement. Although the statute theoretically balances the desirability of tax exemption against the undesirability of unfair competition
with taxable entities, this equilibrium has been upset by unreasoned factual
determinations of courts. The trade or business concept is not ill-suited to the
objective of taxing UBTI, but it has thus far been unworkable, largely reflecting the inadequacy of precedent in articulating an analytical format.
Problems anticipated in calculating a qualified trust's UBTI, however,
may be mooted by the recent debut of statutory provisions establishing excise
taxes on prohibited transactions5 4 and fiduciary standards for policing trustees.1 55 Violation of these requisites will bring stiffer penalties, and acquiescence
by taxpayers may dismiss the priority of UBTI issues. Nevertheless, if necessary, the Commissioner can always fall back on judicial doctrines and indirect
authority to reformulate a rigid adherence to rules and, accordingly, impose
a tax on UBTI. 158
In conclusion, the statutory framework for ascertaining and taxing unrelated business taxable income represents an admirable effort to implement
154. See id. §§ 4971-4975.
155. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Tit. I, Pt. 4 §§ 401-414, Pub.
L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829, 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 935.
156. The doctrine of substance over form is frequently employed by courts to distill
economic reality from a solution of facts and determine whether it is contrary to form. Cf.

Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. 561 (1978). For example, such reasoning could empower a court to
treat a lease as a sale of personal property. Cf. Starr's Estate v. Commissioner, 274 F.2d 294
(9th Cir. 1959). If the taxpayer was engaged in the bmjitm* of making sales, the income would
be UBTI. See I.,C, ; 512(b)(5) (1982).
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a strategic determination of the respective territories of taxable and tax-exempt
entities. Despite its tedious and meticulous process, such framework should be
heeded. Congress has espoused its policy of precluding unfair competition and,
in addition, has declared the moment at which such unfair competition arises:
engagement in an unrelated trade or business regularly carried on. Unfortunately, these issues have not enjoyed the courts' most patient analysis. However, rises in private pension planning will continue to spawn questions regarding appropriate use of the funds and hopefully contribute some illuminating case law to an otherwise vague and ambiguous area.
JONATHAN SHIRLEY
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